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Abstract
We construct a simple model incorporating various urban labour mar-
ket phenomena obtaining in developing economies and we give a di-
agrammatic formulation of the market equilibrium. Our initial for-
mulation assumes an integrated labour market and allows for entre-
preneurship, self-employment and wage employment. We then in-
troduce labour market segmentation. In equilibrium voluntary and
involuntary self-employment, formal and informal wage employment,
and formal and informal entrepreneurship may all coexist. We illus-
trate the model by an example calibrated on Latin American data,
examining individual labour market transitions and implications of
education/training and labour market policies.
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1 Introduction
Urban labour markets in developing economies exhibit considerable diversity,
typically including substantial segments of both voluntary and involuntary
self-employment, and of formal and informal wage employment. In Latin
America and the Caribbean, for example, Perry et al. (2007) nd that, on
average, 24% of urban employment is informal self-employment and 30% is
informal wage employment, and that each of these segments have signicant
voluntary and involuntary elements.1 The aim of the present paper is to
formulate a simple model that incorporates all of these labour market states,
as well as di¤erent types of entrepreneurship, and to develop a diagrammatic
analysis of market equilibrium. Some recent literature on informality based
on search-and-matching theory also incorporates the interaction of several of
these labour market states (Albrecht et al., 2009; Margolis et al., 2012), but
is rather complex and relies extensively on simulations to generate results.
In contrast to most of the theoretical literature on informality, we model
in detail the supply as well as the demand side of the labour market.2 We
assume that each agent can allocate his or her labour to one of three ac-
tivities: self-employment, wage employment, or entrepreneurship (running a
rm and providing wage employment to others).3 An agent is characterized
in terms of two skills, Y and Z, where, loosely speaking, Y is the ability
1See Fields (2009) for a general discussion of the complexity of labour markets in
developing economies and of approaches to modeling them.
2Galiani and Weinschelbaum (2012) analyse both sides of the market, but their focus,
in particular their concern with the e¤ects of social programs, is di¤erent from ours.
3In the absence of functioning systems of unemployment insurance and protection from
job loss, open unemployment is rarely an option for workers in developing economies
(Ghosh, 2012).
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to produce and sell an output, and Z is managerial ability. Success as a
self-employed worker would depend on the amount y of skill Y possessed;
but, following the Lazear (2005) jack-of-all-tradesformulation, success as
an entrepreneur would depend on applying both skills together, specically,
on the value of min(y; z), where z is the amount of Z the agent possesses. In
wage employment, however, everyone is assumed to be equally able.4
We develop two versions of the model. First, in our benchmark case,
we assume that the market for wage employment clears, so that all labour
states are voluntary.This is useful for expositional purposes, providing the
groundwork for the second version of the model, in which we assume labour
market segmentation. However, it is also of interest in its own right because
empirical evidence suggests that in some developing economies labour mar-
kets may be largely integrated (see, e.g., El Badaoui et al. (2008) on South
Africa and for general discussion of the empirical literature). In the second
version we assume that segmentation is the result of a minimum wage, with
which there is full compliance in formal employment. The simplicity of our
diagrammatic formulation is thus bought at the cost of this limitation of the
model. In practice, however, the wage oor in formal work might instead be
the result of union bargaining or of e¢ ciency wage considerations, and there
may be limited compliance with a minimum wage. In the concluding section
we discuss briey the potential for generalizing the model to allow for these
factors.
For the benchmark model, we begin by characterizing the supply function
4This simplifying assumption is common in the informality literature. Its justication
is that across the population we may expect di¤erences in the ability to perform wage
work to be relatively small, compared to ability in self-employment and entrepreneurship.
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of an agent to the three activities. Two cases are developed (depending on
parameter values) which may be interpreted as corresponding to di¤erent un-
derlying macroeconomic conditions, and the implications for labour market
transitions that may occur as agents acquire greater skills are discussed. The
model also generates a demand for wage labour by those agents who choose
entrepreneurship. Given the joint distribution of y and z across individuals,
and a exible wage rate, we characterize the labour market equilibrium and
examine its comparative statics. We depict this equilibrium in a diagram
which we later adapt to the second version of the model.
In practice, informality is generally associated with smaller size (Perry et
al., 2007). This is because formal regulations may only apply to larger rms,
and, insofar as they apply to all rms, informal rms may eschew larger size
to avoid detection.5 In the second version of the model we therefore assume
that the minimum wage rate applies only for rms above a certain size, with
such rms being regarded as formal, and smaller rms as informal. For this
case we show that informal and formal wage employment can coexist with
voluntary and involuntary self-employment. If an agent who is rationed out
of a formal wage job chooses self-employment, this is involuntary in the sense
that it is not the agents rst choice though it is voluntary in the sense that
it is chosen freely from the remaining options. Involuntary entrepreneurship
may also obtain, i.e., agents who are rationed out of formal wage employment
may choose, according to their second preference, to run a rm and employ
others.6 Our analysis is not restricted to any particular rationing scheme
5See Ahsan and Pages (2007) on India, and Almeida and Carneiro (2009) on Brazil.
6A related phenomonen in developed economies is the worker who is made redundant
and then uses his or her redundancy payment or savings to set up a business.
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to allocate formal jobs between the subset of agents who would like to take
them. We note, however, that a potential ine¢ ciency exists (in addition
to the distortion caused by the minimum wage rate): agents who are lucky
enough to gain formal jobs may actually have a comparative advantage in
self-employment. In equilibrium this has an adverse e¤ect on output by both
informal and formal rms.
We end this section by considering briey the transitions of workers be-
tween di¤erent labour market states. The empirical literature on Latin Amer-
ica indicates that young people tend to get informal jobs when they leave
school, and that these jobs are often used as a stepping-stone to acquire
skills. Formal employment may later be obtained, but for many the ultimate
destination is voluntary self-employment (Perry et al., 2007; Bosch and Mal-
oney, 2010; Cunningham and Salvagno, 2011). Although our model is not
dynamic, it is found to be consistent with these observations.
To illustrate the model we explore an example calibrated so that it gener-
ates values that correspond broadly to Latin American data. This generates
some implications for policy, albeit tentative given the stylized nature of the
model. First, to diminish informality, a cut in the cost of formality may
be more e¤ective than an increase in the cost of informality. Second, it is
more e¤ective to provide education and training that improves the ability to
produce and sell, rather than managerial skills. Third, policy changes that
might have been expected to favour entrepreneurship may reduce the total
number of entrepreneurs, while increasing (formal) employment and output
by the relatively able ones.
Following the lead of Rauch (1991), many contributions to the informality
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literature, including Fortin et al. (1997), Amaral and Quintin (2006), Fiess
et al. (2010) and de Paula and Scheinkman (2011), assume agents di¤er with
respect to a single ability parameter.7 Antunes and Cavalcanti (2007) also
include bequestsas a second dimension by which agents are characterized,
while Galiani and Weinschelbaum (2012) incorporate into their analysis sec-
ondary workers (from the same household as the head), showing that these
workers are likely to choose informal work. Yet, although these analyses
lay bare various important issues underlying informality in practice, they do
not allow for the simultaneous existence of informal wage labour and infor-
mal self-employment. Gollin (2008) is an exception, developing a dynamic
equilibrium model of capital accumulation in which an agents time is split
between self employment and working as a wage employee. However, none
of these contributions allow for the simultaneous existence of voluntary and
involuntary informality.
Recently, a separate branch of the literature has grown, which develops
search-and-matching models of informality. In this framework additional
labour market states can be added at the cost of some complexity. In partic-
ular, in the formulation by Albrecht et al. (2009), all choices are voluntary,
and a worker can be in one of four states: unemployment, informal self-
employment, or formal wage employment either as a new hire (an outsider)
7Rauchs formulation incorporates informality into the framework developed by Lucas
(1978). Jovanovic (1994) generalizes Lucass approach in a di¤erent direction, includ-
ing heterogeneity of both labour and management skills, but he is not concerned with
informality (see also Poschke, 2013). A variation of the approach in the present paper
is formulated by Bennett et al. (2012), with individuals characterized in terms of both
ability and risk aversion. It is found, for example, that the allocation of workers between
informal and formal employment depends on the source of the risk involved in informal
work (opportunistic non-payment by the employer or detection and penalties imposed by
the authorities).
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or as an insider with a higher wage. Ability is one-dimensional, and it is
assumed only to a¤ect an agents productivity in a formal sector job. A
simulation gives insight into how workers respond to informal or formal job
o¤ers according to their ability, and into the e¤ects of di¤erent tax policies.
A variation on this approach, with four labour market states (unemployment,
self-employment, formal wage employment and informal wage employment)
is formulated by Margolis et al. (2012) as the basis for empirical analysis of
the Malaysian labour market.
Section 2 formulates the benchmark version of the model, with a market-
clearing wage rate. Section 3 introduces labour market segmentation, and
Section 4 applies the model in the Latin American context, examining the
policy conclusions. Section 5 concludes. Proofs are given in the Appendix.
2 The Benchmark Model
Consider a large population P of agents, each of which is characterized in
terms of two skills, Y and Z. Y may be thought of as the ability to pro-
duce and sell, and Z as managerial skill. An agents levels of Y and Z are
distributed on the non-negative intervals y 2 y; y and z 2 [z; z], respec-
tively. Skills are distributed across P according to f(y; z). Throughout, for
simplicity, we assume that f(:) is continuous and positive for all y and z.
Any agent may have one of three occupations: wage employment, self-
employment or entrepreneurship. We assume a self-employed person does
not employ others  rather, any employment of others qualies the per-
son to be categorized as an entrepreneur.8 Regardless of an agents (y; z)-
8Our assumption is consistent with the denition that Lazear (2005) gives of an entre-
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characteristics, he or she has the same ability to do wage work as any other
person. However, for self-employment and entrepreneurship, ability matters.
If an agent with characteristics (y; z) is self-employed, he or she produces
the quantity y; that is, for self-employment the ability to produce and sell
matters, but managerial skillsdo not.9 If, alternatively, he or she is an en-
trepreneur, the relevant measure of skill is min (y; z)  A; that is, a balance
of both types of skill matters.10 Such a person runs a rm for which the
production function is
x = Al,  2 (0; 1), (1)
where x is output and l is the number of people the rm employs. Our
specications of production are chosen to keep the analysis simple. The same
qualitative results would be obtained without the Leontief specication of A,
provided the two types of skill are su¢ ciently weak substitutes; and with
some concavity of the production function for the self-employed.
Let q and p be the prices for the output of the self-employed and en-
trepreneurial rms, respectively, and let w be the money wage rate. An
entrepreneurs prot is therefore px  wl, which, given (1), is maximized at
l = l^(A), where
l^(A) =

Ap
w
 1
1 
. (2)
preneur as being conceptually distinct from a self-employed person.
9In practice self-employment covers a wide range of activity. Self-employed production
with low y may be, e.g., construction work or street vending, while that with high y may
be, e.g., professional work. A similar comment applies to entrepreneurial output.
10Since we are concerned with relatively small rms, the productive and sales skills of
the entrepreneur will generally matter for a rms success. De Mel et al. (2008) suggest
that the case for a jack-of-all-trades characterization is stronger if the market for business
services is thin, as typically obtains in developing economies. Bloom et al. (2013) report on
recent eld experiments in developing countries that show that some forms of basic business
training and advice can have signicant e¤ects on performance in small enterprises.
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We assume that both self-employment and entrepreneurship give an agent a
non-pecuniary benet v, which may be thought of as the desire for indepen-
dence.11 Thus, letting UW , US and UE denote the utility from working,
self-employment and entrepreneurship, respectively, we have
UW = w; US = qy + v; UE = pAl^   wl^ + v. (3)
We shall only consider cases in which w > v, which is necessary for wage
employment to exist in equilibrium.
We partition P into three sets, W , S and E, according to whether an
agents rst preference is for wage employment, self employment or entrepre-
neurship, respectively.12 Thus, the sets are dened by
W : UW > max (UE;US) ;
S : US > max (UW;UE) ; (4)
E : UE > max(UW;US).
Using (2) and (3), we can determine the borderline values of parameters
underlying (4):
UW ? UE as A 7 B(w); (5)
UW ? US as y 7 C(w); (6)
UE ? US as A ? [D(w)]y1   ~z(y): (7)
11Perry et al. (2007) stress the signicance of this non-pecuniary benet in Latin Amer-
ica and the Caribbean. An implication in our model is that in equilibrium, depending
on ability, some agents could earn more in informal wage employment than from self-
employment, while for others the reverse is true. This is consistent with the mixed em-
pirical evidence on which of these types of earnings is the higher (see, e.g., Agénor, 2007).
With minor amendments, our analysis would still apply if v = 0 or even if v < 0, in
which case v might be interpreted as the disutility of extra e¤ort required from indepen-
dent/entrepreneurial work.
12Throughout, we simplify the exposition by only specifying strong preference.
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where B(w)  (w=) ((w   v) = (1  ))1  =p; C(w)  (w   v)=q; and
D(w)  (w=p) (q= (p (1  )))(1 )=. Note that B(w) C(w) R 0 as q=p R
Q(w), where
Q(w) =  (1  )1 

w   v
w

: (8)
A relatively low q=p might be interpreted as reecting strong aggregate de-
mand, being tilted towards the largely higher-quality output of entrepreneur-
ial rms. Since  (1  )1  2 (1=2; 1), Q(w) 2 (0; 1). Thus, if q < p then
either q=p > Q(w) or q=p < Q(w); but if q  p, q=p > Q(w).
Using (5)-(8), Proposition 1 characterizes the allocation of agents to the
three sets, W , S and E and Figures 1-2 give an intuitive illustration.
Proposition 1 Consider agent iyz with characteristics (y; z). (i) for q=p >
Q(w), iyz 2 W if y < C(w); iyz 2 S if either y 2 (C(w); D(w)) or both
y > D(w) and z < ~z(y); and iyz 2 E otherwise. (ii) for q=p < Q(w),
iyz 2 W if either y < B, or both y 2 (B(w); C(w)) and z < B(w); iyz 2 S if
y > C(w) and z < ~z(y); and iyz 2 E otherwise.
In Figure 1(a) q=p > Q(w) and in Figure 1(b) q=p < Q(w). Thus, for
given w, in 1(a) self-employment is relatively more attractive, compared to
entrepreneurship, than in 1(b). For simplicity, it is assumed in these gures
that y = z and y = z = 0. Consider Figure 1(a), in which q=p > Q(w). For
individuals with y < C(w) self-employment and entrepreneurship both o¤er
relatively low rewards and so wage employment is preferred. If y > C(w)
either self-employment or entrepreneurship is preferred. For C (w) < y <
D (w) self-employment is preferred, but when y > D(w), entrepreneurship is
9
preferred if z is large enough, with the critical value of z increasing in y.13
[Figure 1 about here]
The gures may be interpreted in terms of an agents transition between
labour market states as skills are acquired. Consider, for example, an agent
with skill z = z1 in Figure 1(a). Starting from a low level, the acquisition
of greater skill y enables a transition from W to S, and then from S to E;
but the acquisition of su¢ ciently high skill y enables a transition back to S.
Thus, for some agents, even for changes in y alone, the transition between
labour market states may be non-monotonic.14 Figure 1(b) is signicantly
di¤erent to 1(a) in that, as y rises, an agent may switch directly from W to
E, with no intermediate stage S. An implication is that, for increases in y
(or z) alone, monotonicity obtains, though, as in 1(a), some agents belong to
S at the highest values of y even though at lower y they would belong to E.
Remark 1 The mobility implications of education and training that a¤ect
individualsability Y can depend on macroeconomic factors (p and q) as well
as individual-specic ones (Z here).
In Figure 1(a), where q=p is low (strong aggregate demand) transitions
may occur straight from W to E, however small the increase in Y . But in
Figure 1(b), where q=p is high (weak aggregate demand) only a relatively
large addition to skill Y would enable direct transition from W to E; in
13If there were some limited substitutability of the two skills in the entrpreneurial pro-
duction function, there would be no straight boundaries between E and the other sets,
but the properties of the gure would be una¤ected.
14If there is incremental acquisition of both skills y and z, and this occurs sequentially
over time, then repeated switches between E and S are also possible.
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the absence of such large additions to skill, self-employment may play an
important transitional role.
Aggregating over P , we obtain the supplies of labour to the three activi-
ties. We denote the total supplies to wage employment, self-employment and
entrepreneurship by Ls, SEs and Es, respectively. For each entrepreneur
the demand for labour is given by l^ (A) in (2) and thus we obtain the total
demand for labour, Ld.
Lemma 1 The comparative statics of the supply and demand for wage labour
are as follows:
Ldp > 0; L
d
q < 0; L
d
w < 0; L
s
q < 0; L
s
w > 0; L
s
v < 0;
Ldv

= 0 for q=p > Q(w)
> 0 for q=p < Q(w)
; Lsp

= 0 for q=p > Q(w)
< 0 for q=p < Q(w)
.
The demand for wage labour is increasing in the price of the rmsout-
put and decreasing in the money wage. It is decreasing in the price paid for
the output of the self-employed because a higher price for this output makes
entrepreneurship relatively less attractive. A greater benet, v, from in-
dependence makes entrepreneurship (and self employment) more attractive
relative to wage employment. However, this is only associated with more
agents choosing entrepreneurship if there are agents on the margin of choice
between entrepreneurship and wage employment (Figure 1(b)).
The supply of wage labour is increasing in the money wage rate, and de-
creasing in the price of self-employed output and benet from independence.
If the output price p is higher then, again, provided there are agents on the
margin of choice between entrepreneurship and wage employment (Figure
11
1(b)), wage employment becomes less attractive relative to entrepreneurship
for these agents, and so the supply of wage labour is lower.
We can now specify su¢ cient conditions for equilibrium in the labour
market, including the coexistence of wage employment and self employment.
We denote the lowest and highest levels of A in P by A and A, respectively,
and we dene w and w as
UE (A;w) = UW (w) ; UE
 
A;w

= UW (w) . (9)
Thus, w is the level of the wage w at which an agent with A = A would
be indi¤erent between being an entrepreneur and a worker, and w is dened
similarly for A = A.
Proposition 2 If UE (A;w) < US
 
y

< UW (w) < US (y) < UE
 
A;w

then there exists a wage w 2 (w;w) such that Ld (w) = Ls (w) and the
sets E; S;W are non-empty.
Depending on whether the market-clearing wage rate w is such that
q=p > Q(w) or q=p < Q(w), Figure 1(a) or 1(b), respectively, can be
interpreted as representing this equilibrium.
Lemma 2 In equilibrium (w = w), dw=dp > 0, dw=dq ? 0 and dw=dv > 0;
and total wage employment L satises
dL
dp
> 0

if q=p > Q(w),
if q=p < Q(w) and LdpL
s
w   LdwLsp > 0;
dL=dq < 0;
dL
dv
=

< 0 if q=p > Q(w),
? 0 if q=p < Q(w).
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If the price p of the entrepreneurial output is higher then Ld is greater,
as is w. Set W is therefore larger, subject, when q=p < Q(w), to a sta-
bility condition. If the output price q for the self-employed is higher, the
greater attractiveness of self-employment is associated with lower supply of
and lower demand for wage labour, the latter e¤ect arising because the sup-
ply of entrepreneurship is smaller. Thus, W is smaller, but the net e¤ect on
w may be of either sign. A greater desire for independence v stimulates both
self-employment (reducing the supply of wage labour) and entrepreneurship
(increasing the demand for wage labour). The latter e¤ect implies a greater
demand for wage labour, but as the supply of wage labour is smaller we can
only sign the e¤ect on W when q=p > Q(w).
3 Labour Market Segmentation
We now examine the equilibrium that obtains when the wage rate w is xed
by law, at wf , above the market-clearing level w. As rst specied by Rauch
(1991), we assume that only rms above a certain threshold employment
level l = l0 pay the minimum wage wf , whereas rms with l  l0 pay the
market-clearing wage w = wi. The former rms are denoted formaland
the latter informal. In Rauchs model (in which skill is one-dimensional)
there is a critical entrepreneurial skill level above which formality is chosen,
with informality being chosen otherwise. In our model there is a critical
level of A, A = ~A, that plays a similar role. This is the level of A at which
the entrepreneur achieves the same utility from operating informally at the
maximum employment level l0 as from operating formally at the higher,
13
prot-maximizing employment level l^(A); i.e.,
UE( ~A;wi; l0) = UE( ~A;wf ; l^( ~A)). (10)
Of agents choosing entrepreneurship, those with A > ~A choose formality. As
in Rauchs model there is a gap in the size-distribution of rms at A = ~A.
With this revised model, the utility from self-employment is the same as
in (3), but we now distinguish the respective utilities, Uf and Ui from formal
and informal wage work:
US = qy + v; UWf = wf ; UWi = wi. (11)
The utilities from formal and informal entrepreneurship are denoted by UEf
and UEi, where
UEj = pAl

j   wj l^j + v, j = f; i. (12)
For an informal entrepreneur (A  ~A), if there were no constraint on informal
employment we would have li = l^i(A) = (Ap=wi)
1=(1 ). So the constraint
l  l0 binds exactly if (Ap=wi)1=(1 ) = l0; i.e., if A = wil1 0 =p  A0.
Thus, for rms operating informally,
li =

l^i(A) if A0 > A;
l0 if ~A  A  A0;
and for rms operating formally
lf = l^f =

Ap
wf
 1
1 
.
The population P can be partitioned into four sets according to their rst
preferences in the labour market.15 In the appendix we specify the equali-
ties parallel to (5)-(8) that underlie these rst preferences (as well as those
15For each agent, the rst preference is voluntary, but we only use this term in naming
a set if the distinction will be necessary below where we specify involuntary sets (for
which a similar comment applies).
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underlying second preferences). Our notation will be to write in parentheses
f for formal and i for informal, and then to add a subscript V for voluntary
and I for involuntary if a further distinction is necessary. Thus, all agents
belong to one of the following sets.
1. Formal entrepreneurship, denotedE(f); dened by UEf > max(UEi; US; UWf ).
2. Voluntary informal entrepreneurship, denoted EV (i); dened by UEi >
max(UEf ; US; UWf ).
3. Voluntary self-employment, denoted SV ; dened by US > max(UEf ; UEi; UWf ).
4. Formal employment, denotedW (f); dened by UWf > max(UEf ; UEi; US).
SetW (f) can be partitioned into those agents who obtain a formal job (set
W (f)+) and those who do not (set W (f) ). Members of set W (f)  attain
their second preferences; i.e., they allocate their labour involuntarily. Each
belongs to one of the following sets.16
1. Involuntary informal entrepreneurs, denoted EI(i); dened by UEi >
max(US;UWi).
2. Involuntary self-employed, denoted SI ; dened by US > max(UEi; UWi).
3. Informal employees, denoted W (i); dened by UWi > max(UEi; US).
Proposition 3 Suppose rms may be formal, with l > l0 and paying wage
wf , where wf > w, or informal, with l  l0 and paying the market clearing
16No (y; z)-combinations exist for which both (i) formal employment is rst preference
and (ii) formal entrepreneurship second preference; i.e., involuntary formal entrepreneur-
ship is not feasible.
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wage wi. Then the sets E(f), EV (i), SV , W (f)+, EI(i), SI and W (i) may,
simultaneously, all be non-empty in equilibrium.
We prove the proposition by giving an example in which, indeed, the sets
E(f), EV (i), SV , W (f)+, EI(i), SI and W (i) are, simultaneously non-empty
in equilibrium. We delay giving this example until Section 5, however, where
we relate it to Latin American data, because we wish to consider this example
in its own right. The sets listed in the proposition are not necessarily non-
empty, and degenerate equilibria may easily be formulated (e.g., if q=p were
su¢ ciently high all agents would belong to set SV ). But we shall focus on
cases in which all the sets (except possibly EI(i)) are non-empty because
these correspond to the labour markets observed in practice.
Proposition 3 is illustrated in Figure 2, which is a development of Figure
1, and can be interpreted as representing the equilibrium with endogenous
adjustment of wi. As previously, the cases shown correspond to di¤erent
ranges of q=p relative to Q, but whereas in Figure 1 Q was a function of
the single wage rate w, now there are two wage rates, wf and wi in the
model. The relevant formulation is Q(wi; wj) with j = f; i, where the rst
argument is the unit cost of labour to the entrepreneur and the second is
the wage earned in activity j.17 This is derived in the appendix, along with
the borderline parameter values B(; ), C() and D() shown in Figure 2.
Panel (i) illustrates the case in which q=p > Q(wi; wf ) > Q(wi; wi), which
corresponds to the case shown in Figure 1(a); in panel (ii) Q(wi; wf ) > q=p >
17In Figures 1(a) and 1(b) Q(w) is the critical value of q=p determining whether the
borderline value of y (and of z for entrepreneurship) at which UW = UE is greater or less
than that at which UW = US. Now two di¤erent values of Q come into play, depending
on whether an employed agent earns wf or wi.
16
Q(wi; wi), which is essentially a hybrid of the Figure 1(a)- and 1(b)-cases;
and in panel (iii) Q(wi; wf ) > Q(wi; wi) > q=p, which corresponds to Figure
1(b). Each of the panels can be explained in three steps.18
[Figure 2 about here]
First, using equations (1)-(7) with w = wf and (10), we determine the
(y; z)-characteristics of the members of the rst-preferencesets E(f), EV (i),
SV and W (f). The rst three of these sets are shown unshaded, while set
W (f) is shown by the entire shaded area in each panel.
Second, because the rationing scheme has not been specied, note that
membership of set W (f)+ may come from anywhere in the shaded area (set
W (f)) in each panel.
Third, disregarding temporarily the allocation of agents to set W (f)+,
we treat the shaded area in the same way as we did the whole of (y; z)-
space in Figures 1(a) and 1(b). Thus, for the agents concerned, we show the
preference among the three options of entrepreneurship, self-employment and
informal wage employment, given that all three options are involuntary in
the sense that these agents would prefer formal wage employment. Thus we
determine the second-preferencesets EI(i), SI and W (i), with the proviso
that a selection of agents with (y; z)-characteristics consonant with these sets,
belong instead to set W (f)+.
For a given (y; z)-distribution, we assume that wi adjusts endogenously
such that informal wage labour supply (from set W (i)) equals informal wage
labour demand (from set EV (i)[EI(i)). The other allocations are determined
18If wf is not signicantly above w the horizontal boundary of the set E(f) will meet
the upward-sloping boundary of set EV (i) and terminate there.
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simultaneously. It can be seen that relatively highly-skilled agents with a
balanced skill set become formal entrepreneurs, while those not quite so
highly skilled and/or with not quite so balanced skill sets become voluntary
informal entrepreneurs. Agents with a high y, but su¢ ciently low z, become
voluntarily self-employed.
In panel (i), the return to self-employment is relatively high (q=p >
Q(wi; wf ) > Q(wi; wi)). Consequently, there is no involuntary informal entre-
preneurship, involuntary self-employment being preferred instead. However,
the return to self-employment is not so high in panels (ii) and (iii) and so
some involuntary entrepreneurship obtains, with the agents concerned hav-
ing lower values of A = min (y; z) than voluntary entrepreneurs. Roughly
speaking, involuntary informal entrepreneurs have high values of z, but in-
termediate values of y, although a member of set SI may have more of both
skills than a member of set EI(i).
Remark 2 The rationing scheme for formal wage employment may create
an (additional) ine¢ ciency, with output being forgone from self-employment,
and both informal and formal entrepreneurial rms.
Unless the formal wage employees are those with the smallest y endow-
ments in the shaded area in each panel of Figure 2, some output by the
involuntarily self-employed is forgone. Also, in panels (ii) and (iii), insofar
as some agents from the shaded area associated with EI(i) gain formal em-
ployment, there is a negative e¤ect on informal wage labour demand and the
supply of informal output. This impacts negatively on the informal wage
rate wi, causing substitution out of formal wage employment and output.
18
In each panel of Figure 2 an agent with low skills will unless they man-
age to obtain formal wage employment begin in set W (i). As they acquire
skills, they will move north-east in the gure, perhaps shifting into set SI .
Nonetheless, there is a possible non-monotonic transition in the sense that,
if an agent moves from (involuntary) self-employment into a formal wage
job, they may then go back to (voluntary) self-employment if their skills de-
velop su¢ ciently.19 Our model is thus broadly consistent with the empirical
evidence on Latin American transitions. However, there are signicant di¤er-
ences between the panels in Figure 2 in terms of the possible transitions from
informal wage work to entrepreneurship. If skills are acquired incrementally,
in Figure 2(i) an agent will move through intermediate stages of involuntary
and voluntary self-employment. In Figure 2(ii), where q=p not as great as
in Figure 2(i), the only intermediate stage is involuntary self-employment,
while in Figure 2(iii), where q=p is lower still, there is no intervening stage
of self-employment.
4 An Application To Latin American Data
To illustrate the model we calibrate it using Latin American data. We assume
a joint log-normal distribution of skills Y and Z:
f (y; z) =
e k=2
2
22yz
;
where k  (log y)2 + (log z)2 and  is a constant. We x  = 0:5, for
there appears no compelling justication for any particular calibration of
19As in the benchmark model, if q=p is su¢ ciently large, there can be non-monotonic
transitions from self-employment to entrepreneurship and back again.
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this parameter. We set l0 = 5 on the basis of the survey of informality by
Oviedo et al. (2009), who note that informal rms mostlyhave ve or fewer
employees.
The remaining parameters  p,q,v,wf , are calibrated such that our
model matches some recent statistics for various countries in Latin America
and the Caribbean reported by Perry et al. (2007). These are that the pro-
portions of paid private nondomestic employment in urban areas (excluding
entrepreneurs) are 37% formal waged, 28% informal waged, and 34% and
self-employed, while the informal wage is around 59% of the formal wage.20
As we have one additional parameter to calibrate relative to the number of
statistics, we impose one further restriction to identify a unique calibration,
that the benet from independence v is 10% of the minimum wage wf .21
We search numerically for the parameter values that obtain in our model
under the assumption that the rationing scheme for allocating agents in set
W (f) to set W (f)+ is random. As we use a dense lattice to approximate
the innite population of agents assumed in the model, a small degree of
coarseness prevents us from matching these statistics with absolute preci-
sion. However, after adjusting the rst three statistics above to account for
entrepreneurs, the reported estimates (shown under Table 1 below) match
to within one percentage point. For these calibrated parameter values, the
20The proportions of employment are cross-country averages derived from Table 2.1 of
Perry et al., which uses the social protection/legal denition of informality. There is wide
variation across countries and types of worker in the formal-informal wage gap. The gure
of 59% in the text relates to an average-earnings job in Argentina.
21This value is consistent with recent research reviewed by Carter (2010) albeit for de-
veloped economies which argues that the compensating di¤erential from self-employment
is substantially smaller than the widely-cited estimate of Hamilton (2000) of 35% of equiv-
alent employment income.
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Table 1: An example for Latin America
Parameter Change
Baseline (% of P ) q p v wf l0 Y Z
jE(f)j = 0:63 0 + +     + +
jEV (i)j = 6:86       +     +
jEI(i)j = 0:09       +      
jE(f) [ EV (i) [ EI(i)j   +   +     +
jSV j = 23:35 +   +   + +  
jSI j = 7:77 +   + +      
jSV [ SI j +   + +   +  
jW (f)+j = 35:40 0 + +     + +
jW (i)j = 25:99       + +   +
jW (f)+ [W (i)j   +     +   +
wi=wf = 0:5807   + +   + + +
q = 0:55; p = 0:9;  = 0:5; v = 0:1; wf = 1:1; l0 = 5;  = 1:63:
price of entrepreneurial output p is around two-thirds higher than the price
of self-employed output q. The table shows the comparative statics of various
parameter changes. The rst ve columns show the signs for small increases
in the value of each of the parameters listed and last two columns give the
e¤ects of positive incremental shifts in the distributions shown.
The comparative statics signs shown in the table can be understood in-
tuitively for any parameter by rst considering the e¤ect on rst preferences
and then on second preferences. Consider, for example, an increase in the
self-employed price q: Because there are no agents on the borderline of choice
between formal entrepreneurship and self-employment, this has no e¤ect on
set E(f), and therefore none on W (f)+. However, it causes a switch in rst
preferences away from formal employment and informal entrepreneurship to-
wards self-employment, and so set EV (i) becomes smaller and SV larger.
The higher value of q also causes a shift towards self-employment as a sec-
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ond preference, and so set SI becomes larger, but W (i) and EI(i) smaller.
Although the supply of informal labour falls, the decrease in the demand
dominates and so wi falls. Overall, there are more self-employed and fewer
entrepreneurs and wage workers. Similar explanations can be given for other
parameter changes, but, for brevity, we focus on some potential policy tools.
First, consider changes in parameters wf and l0. l0 can be regarded as a
policy tool even if it is not xed by government regulation; changes in the
probability of detection of informality or in the penalties when caught would
a¤ect the informal employment level that entrepreneurs are willing to set. A
lower wf is a reduced cost of formality, while a lower l0, limiting informal rm
size further, can be interpreted as an increased cost of informality. We might
expect each of these changes to result in less informality. Indeed, reducing wf
does cause E(f) andW (f)+ to become larger, while EV (i) andW (i) become
smaller. However, while a reduction in l0 also causes E(f) and W (f)+ to
expand and W (i) to contract, the e¤ect on informal activity is not clear-cut,
for it expands EV (i) and EI(i). Thus, in this example, if the aim is to reduce
informality, a reduction in wf might be preferred. Nonetheless, although a
reduction in the minimum wage rate is a shift towards the (static) rst best,
the reduction it causes in the number of informal entrepreneurs may also
have an adverse longer-term e¤ect if informal entrepreneurship provides a
learning experience for some potential future formal entrepreneurs.
Second, the results are suggestive of the e¤ects of di¤erent types of edu-
cation/training. In Table 1 a general increase in skill Z expands both E(f)
and EV (i), as well asW (f)+ andW (i), while both SV and SI are diminished.
However, a general increase in skill Y , with or without an associated increase
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in Z, diminishes EV (i) andW (i), while a switch occurs into SV from SI . Sup-
pose that both general education and on-the-job training would increase the
stock of Y , whereas specialist management training is required to increase
the stock of Z. This suggests that, if the aim is to reduce informality then,
because of the role played by voluntary self-employment, general education
and on-the-job training is more e¤ective.
5 Concluding Comments
We construct a parsimonious model that captures some of the complexity
that obtains in urban labour markets in developing economies. In the bench-
mark version the labour market is unsegmented and agents may be in one of
three states self employment, wage employment and entrepreneurship. The
second version of the model adds labour market segmentation. In equilib-
rium, voluntary and involuntary self-employment, formal and informal wage
employment, and formal and informal entrepreneurship (the latter possibly
dividing into voluntary and involuntary components) may all coexist. We
also develop a diagrammatic interpretation of both the segmented and the
unsegmented cases.
Our analysis suggests the importance of underlying macroeconomic con-
ditions in determining the e¤ects of education and training on transitions
of individuals between labour market states, and that these transitions may
be non-monotonic. The role of the rationing scheme by which workers are
selected for formal jobs is also highlighted. As an illustration, a numerical
example is developed that generates results that correspond closely to Latin
American experience. In this example, if the government wishes to reduce
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informality, reduction of the costs of formality is generally more e¤ective
than increasing the costs of informality, while education and training that
improves the ability of individuals to produce and sell is more e¤ective than
increasing managerial skills.
These results are obtained from a highly stylized model, in particular
from the assumption of a competitive labour market, the only imperfection
being a minimum wage for formal employers with which there is full com-
pliance. However, we conjecture that some alternative assumptions could
be accommodated into our framework relatively easily. For example, par-
tial compliance by formal rms with the minimum wage law would shift the
boundary between formal and informal entrepreneurship to the south-west in
Figure 2 (assuming that expected penalties for detection are not too large).
The potential e¤ects would include a substitution into formal from informal
entrepreneurship and, as the informal wage would be driven up, there would
also be a substitution out of informal entrepreneurship into voluntary and
involuntary self-employment.
Similar e¤ects would be obtained if trade unions were included in the
model, with insiders and outsiders among formal-rm employees. However,
a more radical overhaul of the analysis would be required to allow for decen-
tralized bargaining between unions and employers, or for e¢ ciency wages.
For example, in a moral hazard or nutritional model it would have to be
taken into account how worker productivity depends on wage rates. A more
straightforward generalization that might be made would be to allow for
heterogenous innate ability in wage work. Among other factors that might
be included are free labour provided by the family, and wealth and liquidity
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constraints that might hold back both self-employment and entrepreneurship.
Appendix
Proposition 1 Consider rst the conditions under which wage employment
is preferred. If q=p > Q(w) then C < B. Since A  y, we have that
y < C(w) ) A  y < C(w) < B(w); i.e., (6) is su¢ cient for (5) to be
satised. If q=p < Q(w) then B(w) < C(w). To satisfy (5) and (6), we need
either y < B(w) or y 2 (B(w); C(w)) and z < B(w) (since, A  z, so that
z < B(w) is su¢ cient for A < B(w)).
Now consider the conditions under which self-employment is preferred.
We have seen that y > C(w)) US > UW , so now consider what is required
for US > UE. First, suppose A = z; then, from (7), UE > US if A >
[D(w)]y1   ~z(y). For this to be consistent with A = z we require y 
~z(y). Note that, for y > 0, ~z(y) has a unique xed point, ~z(D(w)) = D(w),
and that ~z0(y) = (1 )[D(w)]y  > 0, so that ~z0(D(w)) = 1  < 1. Since
also ~z00(y) =  (1 )[D(w)]y  1 < 0, this implies that y ? D(w), y ?
~z(y). Hence, if y > D(w), we have US > UE , z < ~z(y). Alternatively,
suppose A = y. Then, from (7) y < D(w)) US > UE.
Hence US > UE if either (i) y < D(w) or (ii) y > D(w) and z < ~z(y).
Therefore US > max (UW;UE) when either (i) y 2 (min (C(w); D(w)) ; D(w))
or (ii) y > max (C(w); D(w)) and z < ~z(y). But also, from (5), (7) and (8) we
have that B(w) D(w) ? 0, q=p Q Q(w). Therefore, since B(w) C(w) R
0 as q=p R Q(w), we have q=p R Q(w) , C(w) ? B(w) ? D(w), and the
conditions stated in the proposition under which self-employment is preferred
follow. The conditions under which entrepreneurship is preferred then follow.
Lemma 1 First we nd from (2) and (6)-(7) that l^p > 0; l^q = 0; l^w < 0;
l^v = 0; Bp(w) < 0; Bq(w) = 0; Bw(w) > 0; Bv(w) < 0; Cp(w) = 0;
Cq(w) < 0; Cw(w) > 0; Cv(w) < 0; Dp(w) < 0; Dq(w) > 0; Dw(w) > 0;
Dv(w) = 0; ~zp < 0; ~zq > 0; ~zw > 0; ~zv = 0. Using Proposition 1, rst we
specify the supply of individuals to wage employment and entrepreneurship:
Ls =
( R C
y
R z
z
f(y; z)dzdy for q=p > Q(w);R B
y
R z
z
f(y; z)dzdy +
R C
B
R B
z
f(y; z)dzdy for q=p < Q(w).
Es =
( R y
D
R z
~z(y)
f(y; z)dzdy for q=p > Q(w);R C
B
R z
B
f(y; z)dzdy +
R y
C
R z
~z(y)
f(y; z)dzdy for q=p < Q(w).
Inserting l^ (A) into each double integral in Es we obtain labour demand, Ld.
Using A  min (y; z), this can be written
Ld =
8>><>>:
R y
D
R y
~z(y)
l^ (z) f(y; z)dzdy +
R y
D
R z
y
l^ (y) f(y; z)dzdy q=p > Q(w);R C
B
R y
B
l^ (z) f(y; z)dzdy +
R C
B
R z
y
l^ (y) f(y; z)dzdy
+
R y
C
R y
~z(y)
l^ (z) f(y; z)dzdy +
R y
C
R z
y
l^ (y) f(y; z)dzdy
q=p < Q(w):
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Di¤erentiating Ls and Ld by (p; q; w; v) and using these inequalities, the
lemma is obtained.
Proposition 2 From (9), w = w ) W = ?; w = w ) E = ?. Therefore,
Ls (w) = 0; Ld (w) = 0. If w = w, UE
 
A;w

> US
 
A
 ) E 6= ? )
Ld > 0; and if w = w, UW (w) > US
 
y
 ) W 6= ? ) Ls > 0. It
follows that, if both UE
 
A;w

> US
 
A

and UW (w) > US
 
y

the excess
demand functions satisfy Ld (w)   Ls (w) > 0 and Ld (w)   Ls (w) < 0.
Then, by the continuity of Ld Ls, there must exist a w 2 (w;w) such that
Ld(w)   Ls(w) = 0. Additionally, if w = w then UE (A;w) < US (A) )
S 6= ?, and if w = w then UW (w) < US (y) ) S 6= ?. The proposition
follows.
Lemma 2 Writing labour supply and supply as Ls(w; i) and Ld(w; i), re-
spectively, where i = (p; q; v), when w = w, dw=di = (Ldi   Lsi )=(Lsw   Ldw).
Using Lemma 1 with this equation yields dw=dp > 0, dw=dq ? 0 and
dw=dv > 0. Thus, (i) dL=dp = Ldw(dw=dp)+L
d
p = (L
d
pL
s
w LdwLsp)=(Lsw Ldw);
from Lemma 1, Ldw   Lsw < 0 and if q=p > Q(w), Lsp = 0 and the re-
sult for dL=dp follows; (ii) dL=dq = (LdqL
s
w   LdwLsq)=(Lsw   Ldw) < 0; (iii)
dL=dv = (LdvL
s
w   LdwLsv)=(Lsw   Ldw) and the result in the lemma follows.
Borderline Preferences with Labour Market Segmentation To com-
pare the utilities from the di¤erent activities we use (11) and (12).
Self employment versus wage employment. Since wf > wi, UWf > UWi.
Thus, to consider rst preferences, we compare US with UWf . If the agent
is rationed out of a formal job, second preferences matter, so we compare US
with UWi. Thus we obtain
US ? UWj as y ?
1
q
(wj   v)  C(wj), j = f; i.
Since wf > wi, C(wf ) > C(wi).
Entrepreneurship versus self employment. As an entrepreneur, an indi-
vidual chooses formality if A > ~A, but informality otherwise. This gives two
comparisons with self employment:
UEj ? US as A ?
1
pl^j
(qy + wj l^j)  ~zj(y), j = f; i.
As in Section 2, denote the xed points of ~zj(y) as D(wj), j = f; i; i.e.,
~zj(D(wj)) = D(wj).
Entrepreneurship versus wage employment. With respect to the agents
rst preference, we compare UEi with UWf , and if the agent is rationed out
of a formal job, we compare UEi with UWi:
UEi ? UWj as A ?
1
pli
(wj + wili   v)  B (wi; wj) , j = f; i.
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where the rst argument of B(:; :) is the wage paid as an entrepreneur and
the second argument is the wage received as an employee.
We can now dene corresponding values of Q(:; :). B(wi; wj) C(wj) ? 0
as q=p ? Q(wi; wj),where
Q(wi; wj)  wj   v
li(wj + wili   v)
, j = f; i.
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Figure 1(a): Labour allocation for q=p > Q (w)
30
EW
S
CB y
y
z2
z
z
Figure 1(b): Labour allocation for q=p < Q (w)
Figure 2(i): Labour allocation for q=p > Q (wi; wf ) > Q (wi; wi). Shaded
area denotes the set W (f).
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Figure 2(ii): Labour allocation for Q (wi; wf ) > q=p > Q (wi; wi). Shaded
area denotes the set W (f).
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Figure 2 (iii): Labour allocation for Q (wi; wf ) > Q (wi; wi) > q=p. Shaded
area denotes the set W (f).
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